



The Central Role of Home Prices 
in the Current Financial Crisis: 
How Will the Market Clear?
ABSTRACT This paper begins by describing some patterns in home price
movements over recent decades. It then discusses some distinguishing char-
acteristics of housing markets that will contribute to determining prices going
forward: Housing is heterogeneous, making prices hard to measure. Home
prices are subject to inertia and are sticky downward. Housing markets have
traditionally been quantity clearing markets, with excess inventories absorbed
only as new households are formed. And housing markets depend critically
on credit market conditions and monetary policy. Two opposite scenarios for
future home prices are both plausible: The ﬁrst, noting among other things the
many “underwater” mortgages and unsold inventories and the likelihood of a
severe recession, foresees a slow recovery. The second observes that the market
clearing process has been orderly so far and that deep regional housing busts in
the past have sometimes been followed by quick recoveries, suggesting that a
more rapid turnaround is possible.
T
he housing market today lies at the heart of a potentially catastrophic
collapse of the banking and ﬁnancial system. By some measures, hous-
ing prices are down by more than even the most pessimistic forecasters
were predicting a year ago. The collapse in value of the collateral behind the
nation’s $12 trillion portfolio of home mortgages has led to unprecedented
rates of delinquency and foreclosure. The decline in home prices has also
led investors to unwind the layers of risk created by and traded in new,
complex contracts, which now threaten the foundation of the payment
system.
This paper begins with an overview of changes in the value of residential
capital and land over the last four decades. It then lays out some salient facts
about how the housing market has operated in the past, with a focus on
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speciﬁc forecast, the paper presents both the case for a continuing severe
decline, with prices falling well into 2010, and an argument that the market
may begin to stabilize as early as 2009Q1.
Home Prices and Land Values in the United States, 1975–2007
One national index of home prices suggests that nominal prices never fell
over any full quarter between 1975 and 2005. The national quarterly repeat
sales index of the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO;
top panel of ﬁgure 1) rose 532.4 percent, or more than sixfold, in nominal
terms between 1975Q1 and 2007Q1. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 plots the
S&P/Case-Shiller National Index, available back to 1987. Nominal home
prices by this measure fell in a number of quarters, but the overall pattern is
the same: prices were either rising or ﬂat between 1987 and 2005. Nominal
prices rose at an average annual rate of 6.0 percent over the whole period
but began accelerating rapidly in 2000.
Table 1 compares increases in home prices with income growth and
inﬂation. Between January 1975 and December 2006, the consumer price
index (CPI) rose nearly fourfold, implying an average annual rate of increase
of about 4.3 percent over the 32 years. Personal income per capita grew at
the same rate as home prices, although median household income did not
keep pace.
Figure 2, which shows the OFHEO index in real terms, reveals four time
periods when real home prices fell. For purposes of understanding behavior
in the housing and mortgage markets, this paper will focus mostly on nom-
inal home price changes, since household debt is carried in nominal terms.
Although national-average nominal home prices rarely or never fell
during 1975–2005, boom-bust cycles led to substantial periods of decline
in a number of regions. Table 2 presents a rough chronology of these ups
and downs based on repeat sales indexes produced by Fiserv CSW and
OFHEO. Between 1975 and the late 1990s, major price booms occurred in
California (twice) and in the Northeast. Major busts occurred in Texas, the
Northeast, and California.
In 1975 the national economy was in recession. During the recovery,
California experienced a substantial housing price boom, with nominal
prices rising 138 percent between 1975 and 1980. During the same period
home prices in the rest of the country rose by only 64 percent. The California
boom ended during the deep double-dip recession of 1980–83. With the
fixed-rate 30-year mortgage reaching 18 percent and the federal funds
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OFHEO National House Price Index, 1975–2007











S&P/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index, 1987–2008










Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; Standard & Poor’s.
Figure 1. National Nominal Home Price Indexes, Quarterly Data
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expected a sharp drop in home prices. Instead prices merely went ﬂat from
1981 to late 1984, when the next boom began.
Between 1980 and 1985 the recession ended, inﬂation subsided, and
interest rates fell. By the end of the period, national nominal home prices
were up 24 percent, but prices remained substantially below their 1980
peaks in real terms.
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OFHEO basic index of house prices 528 5.9
Median household income 308 4.5
Personal income per capita 526 5.9
Average hourly earnings 270 4.2
Consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) 289 4.3
Sources: Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, and Moody’s Economy.com.
Thousands of dollars






Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; author’s calculations.
a. Values are calculated from the OFHEO National House Price Index adjusted for inflation using the 
consumer price index (CPI-U).
Figure 2. Real Price of a Home Worth $100,000 in 2000, 1975–2007
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Table 2. Housing Booms and Busts since 1975
Change in home prices 
Period and episode (percent)
1975–80
First California boom, ending in recession +138
U.S. national index +64
1980–85
Nominal prices in California hold
Deep recession followed by recovery
U.S. national index +24
1985–90
Texas bust (not preceded by boom), 1986–88 −14
Bottom reached after 10 quarters
Oklahoma bust, 1983–88 −23
Bottom reached after 19 quarters
New England-New York boom, 1984–88 +110
a
New England-New York bust, 1988–92 −12
Bottom reached after 14 quarters
Second California boom, 1984–90 +92
U.S. national index +28
1990–95
Second California bust −13
Bottom reached after 19 quarters
San Diego bust, 1990–96 −17
Bottom reached after 24 quarters
U.S. national index +14
1995–2000
Housing prices rising nationwide
U.S. national index +29
2000–06
U.S. national index +89
Case-Shiller Composite 10 +126
Case-Shiller Composite 20 +107
Miami boom +181
Bottom tier +241
Los Angeles boom +174
Bottom tier +240
Washington, D.C., boom +151
Bottom tier +197
San Diego boom +150
Bottom tier +197




Sources: Standard & Poor’s and Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
a. Figure is for Boston only.
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oil patch states, which had never experienced a housing boom, saw a sharp
decline in their economies, which felt the sting of oil prices falling to $10 a
barrel and newly aggressive bank examiners.
1 Texas and the West South
Central region saw home prices fall 14 percent in nominal terms, with 
a bottom after 10 quarters. A worse decline was felt in Oklahoma, where
nominal prices fell 23 percent, and a bottom was not reached for 19 quarters.
The impact on mortgage defaults was huge.
Precisely as Texas and the rest of the oil patch were in a bust, the North-
east and California housing markets were booming. Nominal home prices
nearly doubled in the Northeast in the ﬁve years from 1984 to 1989. A sec-
ond California boom, which also nearly doubled prices, was in full swing
as the Northeast bubble burst in 1989.
Both the Northeast boom and the second California boom led to busts
of signiﬁcant magnitude. Nominal prices fell 12 percent in the Northeast,
where a bottom was reached in 14 quarters. In California nominal prices
fell 13 percent after their peak in 1990, and a bottom was not reached for
19 quarters. As in California a decade earlier, some areas did worse: in San
Diego prices fell 17 percent and did not hit bottom for 24 quarters.
What came to be called the “rolling recession,” with overlapping housing
market cycles, kept national home price indexes rising steadily, with only
modest cyclicality overall. There were no national booms or busts until 2000.
Beginning in that year, regional housing markets suddenly began to move
together. Over the next six years, a rapid acceleration occurred simultane-
ously in many regions, states, and metropolitan areas. Prices nationwide
increased nearly 90 percent from 2000Q1 to 2006. The S&P/Case-Shiller
Composite 10 and Composite 20 indexes both more than doubled.
2
The last panel of table 2 shows how strong the boom was in many
areas. The gold medal goes to Miami, where prices increased 181 percent
between 2000 and 2006. Los Angeles was just behind at 174 percent, with
Washington, D.C., and San Diego both recording increases of 150 percent.
The sharpest increases in each market were observed in the lowest tier
by value. In Miami and Los Angeles the average property in the bottom
tier more than tripled. Just behind them were the bottom tiers of San Diego
and Washington.
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1. See Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (1991).
2. The Composite 10 index is an index of home prices in Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las
Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Diego, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.
The Composite 20 includes, in addition, Atlanta, Charlotte, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit,
Minneapolis, Phoenix, Portland, Ore., Seattle, and Tampa.
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land, Dallas, Denver, and Detroit all saw healthy but unspectacular price
growth ranging from 23 percent (Cleveland) to 40 percent (Denver). There
was no hint of the kind of booms going on elsewhere.
Table 3 reports the most recent home price data as of this writing,
released by Standard & Poor’s on October 28, 2008, and covering the
period through August. The new data show the declines since the peak of the
market, which occurred at different times in different cities. In September
2005 Boston became the ﬁrst market to peak, and by March 2008, prices
there had fallen 13.1 percent. Prices in Boston have increased slightly each
month since April, so that by August the total decline had moderated to
10.8 percent. From the peak through June 2008, prices in Boston had fallen
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Since  July to  June to  2000 to 
Since one  year August  July  August 
Metropolitan areaa Peak peak before 2008 2008 2008
Atlanta Aug. 2006 −7.7 −8.5 −0.2 +0.3 +24.8
Boston Sept. 2005 −10.8 −4.7 +0.1 +0.2 +62.8
Charlotte Aug. 2007 −2.8 −2.8 −0.8 −0.2 +32.1
Chicago Sept. 2006 −11.3 −9.8 0.0 −0.4 +49.5
Cleveland July 2006 −10.5 −6.6 +1.1 −0.3 +10.5
Dallas June 2007 −2.8 −2.7 −0.2 +0.6 +22.9
Denver Aug. 2006 −5.4 −5.1 0.0 +0.8 +32.6
Detroit Dec. 2005 −27.2 −17.2 0.8 +0.6 −7.6
Las Vegas Aug. 2006 −35.9 −30.6 −2.4 −2.8 +50.5
Los Angeles Sept. 2006 −30.9 −26.7 −1.8 −1.6 +89.2
Miami Dec. 2006 −34.7 −28.1 −1.8 −1.6 +83.5
Minneapolis Sept. 2006 −17.1 −13.8 −1.0 +1.3 +41.9
New York June 2006 −10.7 −6.9 −0.2 −0.7 +92.8
Phoenix June 2006 −36.3 −30.7 −2.9 −2.7 +44.8
Portland, Ore. July 2007 −7.8 −7.6 −1.3 −0.5 +71.9
San Diego Nov. 2005 −32.8 −25.8 −2.3 −1.8 +68.2
San Francisco May 2006 −30.7 −27.3 −3.5 −1.8 +51.4
Seattle July 2007 −8.9 −8.8 −0.7 −1.0 +75.2
Tampa July 2006 −26.8 −18.1 −0.4 0.0 +74.3
Washington, D.C. May 2006 −22.4 −15.4 −0.3 −1.1 +94.9
Composite 10 June 2006 −22.0 −17.7 −1.1 −1.1 +76.6
Composite 20 July 2006 −20.3 −16.6 −1.0 −0.9 +64.6
Source: Standard & Poor’s, October 28, 2008.
a. Metropolitan areas are those tracked in the Case-Shiller Composite 20 index.
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from 1988 to 1992, when prices fell for 14 quarters. Prices in New York
show a similar pattern.
The most severe declines have occurred in Las Vegas, Miami, and
Phoenix, which have all seen prices drop by about 35 percent from peaks
in mid- to late 2006 to August 2008. Just behind them comes California,
where Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco are down more than
30 percent from peak. Next, with declines of over 20 percent, are Detroit,
Tampa, and Washington, D.C. Minneapolis is down 17 percent, followed
by Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, and New York, with declines of just over
10 percent.
Between 2005 and 2008, for the ﬁrst time since regional data became
available, U.S. housing prices fell virtually everywhere. The S&P/Case-
Shiller National Index was down 18.2 percent through 2008Q2, and the
Composite 10 and Composite 20 indexes were down 22.0 percent and
20.3 percent, respectively, through August.
Housing Prices and Income over the Cycle
How did home prices ﬂuctuate relative to local income over these cycles?
In our 2003 Brookings Paper, Robert Shiller and I used state data to
explore the relationship between changes in home prices and one measure
of income.
3 Using data including all 50 states and the District of Columbia
from 1985 though 2002, we found a relatively stable relationship between
personal income per capita and price in 43 states. In the remaining 8, this
relationship was cyclical and volatile.
Similar plots for the three decades leading up to 2008, however, show
volatility spreading. In 2008 all metropolitan-area housing markets fell into
one of three regimes: ﬂat markets, single-peak markets, and regular-cycle
markets. The ﬂat market category includes most of the country. Figures 3
and 4 show the typical pattern of these markets for ﬁve metropolitan areas:
Dallas, Memphis, and Pittsburgh, and Charlotte and Chicago. In these cities
home prices did not signiﬁcantly outpace income; indeed, they fell relative
to income in most periods. In all cities but Chicago, the ratio of home prices
to income per capita drops in the early 1980s and stays ﬂat through 2007,
between 3 and 5. In Chicago the ratio stays ﬂat between 5 and 6, rising to 7
after 2000.
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Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; author’s calculations.
a. Median sales price of existing single-family houses in 2000 deflated with the OFHEO purchase-only price 




Figure 3. Ratios of Home Prices to Personal Income per Capita in the Dallas,
Memphis, and Pittsburgh Metropolitan Areas, 1976–2007
a
Ratio








Sources: Standard & Poor’s; U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Moody’s Economy.com.
Chicago
Charlotte
Figure 4. Ratios of Home Prices to Personal Income per Capita in the Chicago and
Charlotte Metropolitan Areas, 1987–2008
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shows a remarkably similar pattern for the last two. The Phoenix market
remained perfectly stable at a home price-income ratio of around 5 from
1989 through 2000. The ratio then rose slowly to 6 in 2004 before jump-
ing up to 9 in 2006 and falling rapidly back to 6 in 2008. Miami’s ratio
was completely flat at about 6 until around 2000; it then accelerated
upward to 12 by 2006 before dropping sharply.
In the regular-cycle markets of the Northeast and California, the boom-
bust cycle has been virtually continuous. The ratio of home prices to
income in Boston rose from 7 to over 11 during the boom that ended in
1988 (ﬁgure 6). This was followed by a drop back to just above 7 by the
mid-1990s. Beginning in 1989 the ratio again rose sharply, peaking at 12 at
the end of 2005. By the end of 2008Q1 it was back down to 10. A similar
pattern can be found in data for the entire New York–New England region.
In Los Angeles the pattern is the same, but the ratios are higher. Starting
at 7 in the mid-1980s, the ratio rose to almost 11 by 1990 before beginning
a seven-year decline back to 6 by 1997. From 1997 to 2001 the ratio rose
slowly and then accelerated, reaching 16 by the peak in 2006 before falling
back to 11 by mid-2008.
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Sources: Standard & Poor’s; U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Moody’s Economy.com.
Miami
Phoenix
Figure 5. Ratio of Home Prices to Personal Income per Capita in the Phoenix
and Miami Metropolitan Areas, 1989–2008
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Thus far this paper has simply described the pattern of home price move-
ment over the past few decades. The questions of interest today are, When
will prices stop falling? And when will order be restored to the battered
housing and mortgage markets? If prices continue to fall into 2010, as
many have argued they will, the books of mortgage business written in
2008 to 2009 are not likely to be proﬁtable. If prices stop falling today,
default rates will moderate, and recovery will soon follow.
This section of the paper describes the ways in which the housing
market differs from other markets. These differences raise some issues that
are integral to the process that will determine home values going forward.
Some of the distinguishing characteristics of the housing market are the
following:
—Housing is heterogeneous and prices are hard to measure.
—Prices are subject to inertia (bubbles) and are sticky downward.
—Housing markets have traditionally been quantity clearing markets.
—Housing markets depend critically on credit markets and monetary
policy.
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Sources: Standard & Poor’s; U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Moody’s Economy.com.
Los Angeles
Boston
Figure 6. Ratio of Home Prices to Personal Income per Capita in the Boston
and Los Angeles Metropolitan Areas, 1987–2008
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The concept of a market price in the housing market is slippery, because
every home is at least slightly different from every other. An individual home
is a unique combination of both structural and neighborhood characteristics.
The purchase of a home involves buying a bundle of attributes: living space,
heating and other systems, usually a parcel of land of some dimension, a
view, a number of rooms, various structural features (ﬁreplaces, windows,
appliances, and so on), and others. It also involves buying into a speciﬁc
location with a speciﬁc natural environment, a school system, other ameni-
ties, a set of neighbors, a crime rate, and a tax rate. The purchased home
may be of good or poor construction quality and (unless purchased new)
may have been well or poorly maintained. Homes also differ in their degree
of accessibility. All this makes it very difﬁcult to look at a property, com-
pare it with other properties, and know what it is worth.
The price of a home also includes the cost of the capital used to pur-
chase it. Thinking about a home in this way highlights what makes it a
potentially desirable investment. Consider a household buying a home
outright, with no mortgage ﬁnance. The baseline yield on that investment
(essentially the dividend) is the flow of housing services the household
receives net of depreciation, maintenance, and taxes. The ﬂow of dividends
from an investment in corporate equity depends on proﬁts and is taxable
(albeit at a low rate). The ﬂow of real net imputed rent, in contrast, is ﬁxed
and not taxable, and the costs of ﬁnance and property taxes are deductible.
Thus, this component of yield has a stabilizing effect in downturns. Housing
can therefore be seen as a substitute for equities in periods of uncertainty.
In addition to the real services yield, there is the potential for capital gain,
which for most households is also tax free. Housing is typically highly
leveraged, however, so returns are volatile.
Forming reasonable expectations about gains is difﬁcult, again because
housing is heterogeneous. Much has been learned about how expectations
are formed from extensive surveys of homebuyers in the Boston, Los
Angeles, Milwaukee, and San Francisco metropolitan areas. These surveys
were ﬁrst conducted in 1988 and are now conducted annually.
4 They illus-
trate several points: that expectations are backward looking, that buyers
perceive little risk in purchasing a home, and that the expected returns are
unrealistic. For example, two-thirds of buyers surveyed as recently as the
spring of 2008 in Boston and San Francisco believed that prices would rise,
not fall, that year. That ﬁgure was 75 percent in Milwaukee and 54 percent
172 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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11472-03_Case_rev.qxd  3/6/09  12:27 PM  Page 172in Orange County, California. In the 2004 survey, 92 percent of respon-
dents in Boston anticipated a one-year price rise, compared with over 
95 percent in the other three sample sites. In the 2008 survey an even
larger majority expected gains over 10 years, and the mean anticipated
gain in three of the four cities was 10 percent a year (7.5 percent in again
relatively pessimistic Boston).
At a minimum, measurements of changes in home prices must account
for changes in physical attributes. There are two basic approaches, which
both rely on arm’s-length transactions: hedonic price indexes with time
dummies, which require ﬁne detail on changes in characteristics, and repeat
sales indexes, which control for differences by looking only at properties
with at least two observable sales during the relevant period. The advan-
tages and disadvantages of these two approaches and the variations on them
are the subject of much debate, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The important question, addressed below, is, How should these indexes
be interpreted? What do they tell us about what is happening when they
emerge from different market clearing processes taking place at the same
time and in the same market?
Home Prices are Subject to Inertia (Bubbles) and Are Normally 
Sticky Downward
In 1957 Paul Samuelson wrote,
I have long been struck by the fact, and puzzled by it too, that in all the
arsenal of economic theory we have absolutely no way of predicting how
long [a bubble] will last. To say that prices will fall back to earth after they
reach ridiculous heights represents a safe but empty prediction. Why do
some manias end when prices have been ridiculous by 10 per cent, while
others persist until they are ridiculous to the tune of hundreds of per cent?
5
A good deal of evidence indicates that the housing market is prone to
bubbles. I argued in 1986 that the price boom in Boston that began in 1984
was not caused by fundamentals but was indeed a bubble.
6 A structural
supply-and-demand model that had been reasonably successful at predicting
home prices in 9 of the 11 cities in my sample suggested that fundamentals
(income growth, interest rates, employment growth, demographics, and so
forth) should have pushed Boston home prices up by 16 percent. Instead
they increased by over 140 percent before peaking in late 1988.
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actions data obtained from Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco.
7
We found evidence of substantial positive serial correlation in real home
prices. Our 1989 paper showed that a change in price observed over one
year tends to be followed by a change in the same direction the following
year between 25 and 50 percent as large. We found evidence of serial
correlation in excess returns as well. Subsequent work demonstrated that
both California and Massachusetts experienced price bubbles in the 1980s
and 1990s.
8
Price booms like those observed over the past 30 years are more likely
to occur where the elasticity of supply of land is low, as in California and
Massachusetts. The work of Edward Glaeser and his colleagues has focused
attention on zoning and land use regulation.
9 Markets with an elastic supply
of developable land seemed to avoid price booms, Florida and Arizona
being classic examples. From 1990 until 2000, home prices in these mar-
kets could be fully explained by income growth. Between 2000 and the
first half of 2006, however, speculative demand boomed, driving prices
up dramatically despite what remains a very elastic supply of land. As a
result, prices accelerated and building increased faster than immigration
and household formation could absorb the new inventory.
Another important aspect of housing market efﬁciency is that prices tend
to be sticky downward. In most markets, when excess supply develops,
prices fall quickly to clear the market. But housing downturns have been
characterized by sticky prices. Sales and starts drop but prices are slow to
respond.
Demand can drop for a variety of reasons: demographic pressures, a
weak core economy with falling income or rising unemployment, home
prices simply rising far faster than income, or a change in market psychol-
ogy. On the other hand, there have been clear instances of overbuilding,
where supply simply grew faster than demand. All these causal factors
can be present in a single market, and they always interact. A decline in a
regional economy or a glut of condominiums can drive up the number of
listings, newspaper articles, and for-sale signs, which can trigger a shift in
consumer psychology that may accelerate the demand decline.
Prices might be slow to respond to imbalances for various reasons. Since
housing is heterogeneous, comparable sales do not represent identical units,
174 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
7. Case and Shiller (1987, 1989).
8. On the former period see Case and Shiller (1988, 1990).
9. Glaeser (2002); Glaeser and Gyourko (2002); Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005, 2006);
Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2009).
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mined in a stochastic process in which buyers and sellers search for terms
that will lead to a sale. Also, sellers tend to view the worth of their property
as embodied in comparable sales at the peak.
The dramatic rise in inventory of unsold homes at the beginning of
every downturn is strong evidence of this stickiness. Responses to the
survey questions discussed above also provide direct evidence. Buyers who
had sold properties before buying in the four metropolitan areas surveyed
(Boston, Orange County, San Francisco, and Milwaukee) were asked, “If
you had been unable to sell your home for the price that you received, what
would you have done?” Of the 254 respondents to the ﬁrst survey in 1988,
95 (37 percent) said that they would have “left the price the same and
waited for a buyer, knowing full well that it might take a long time.”
Another 70 respondents (28 percent) answered that they would have taken
the house off the market or rented it, and 77 (30 percent) answered that
they would have “lowered the price step by step hoping to find a buyer.”
Only 12 respondents (5 percent) answered that they would have “lowered
the price until a buyer was found.” Results tabulated for the spring 2008
version of the same survey show that individual sellers are more likely to
reduce the price when demand drops. But even in this survey only 20 per-
cent said they “would have lowered the price until they found a buyer.”
Downward stickiness has been most evident when demand declines are
triggered by mortgage rate increases and most homeowners are sitting on
ﬁxed-rate mortgages. The classic example occurred at the end of the Cali-
fornia boom from 1975 to 1980. Home prices during that boom increased
147 percent. But in 1981 interest rates rose and the average mortgage rate
settled between 16 and 18 percent. The combination of high interest rates
and the recession caused the housing market to cool sharply, yet prices in
California never fell in nominal terms during the ensuing period. Selling
induced the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses, and with interest rates so
high, potential sellers preferred to hold onto their low ﬁxed-rate mortgages.
Interestingly, Vancouver, Canada, experienced a very similar run-up in the
late 1970s. However, Canadian law prohibits ﬁxed-rate mortgages with
terms exceeding 10 years. As a result, the increased rates led to higher pay-
ments, which homeowners could not afford. Many sold out or went into
foreclosure. The average nominal price fell by about 60 percent.
10
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and properties do sell. Buyers with enough income or wealth can participate
in the market and may strongly prefer speciﬁc units. Despite the market
turmoil in late 2008, existing-home sales reported by the National Associ-
ation of Realtors remained at a seasonally adjusted rate of 4.98 million as
of October. Foreclosure sales reported by Realtytrac accounted for about
1.0 million, or 20 percent, of these sales.
The S&P/Case-Shiller indexes are based on essentially all arm’s-length
sales of property, but many observed sales are foreclosure sales. Although
the indexes exclude bank purchases, which are usually made at the mortgage
amount, they include bank sales. When a bank or other institution holding
a property after a foreclosure puts the home on the market, its goal is to
clear inventory. Hence there is little observed stickiness. In addition, most
foreclosed properties in the recent episode were ﬁnanced with variable-rate
rather than ﬁxed-rate mortgages, and the downturn in home prices was not
triggered by a rate spike.
Some argue that the Case-Shiller indexes are biased in that auction sales
at fire-sale prices do not represent the “real” market. Any metropolitan-
area price index is, of course, subject to aggregation bias, because each
metropolitan area is made up of many submarkets. A clearer picture of price
movements across space requires submarket indexes, which are available
(see table 6 below).
Many properties sold at auction had originally been purchased at the
peak of the market. Lower-tier price indexes in the glut markets of Las
Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, Phoenix, and San Diego more than doubled
(in some cases tripled) between 2000 and 2006. Excluding auction sales of
the properties that inﬂated dramatically during the boom would present a
biased view of where the market ultimately settled after the bust.
Housing Markets Have Traditionally Been Quantity Clearing Markets
Downwardly sticky prices lead to “quantity clearing markets” rather
than “price clearing markets.” In most markets with excess supply, prices
and output fall immediately. If prices are slow to respond, however,
the burden of adjustment falls on the quantity of production, prolonging
the cycle.
Home prices have followed exactly that pattern over many years.
Demand drops. The inventory of unsold homes rises. Prices stick. Output
falls. The inventory of unsold property remains high (because a house is a
durable good, not a consumable). But household formation rates remain
positive, and the new households eventually absorb the excess inventory
176 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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and ultimately overshoot; demand again slows, starting the next cycle.
The process is accelerated by the fact that housing production is a large
part of aggregate demand. When production falls off, it slows the economy,
which slows demand growth. John Quigley and I found large income
effects from the contractions in housing production that the United States
has experienced over the years.
11
Figure 7 shows just how regular the cycle has been. Since the early
1970s, the United States has gone through four major housing cycles, with
peaks in 1972, 1978, 1984, and 2006. Each time housing starts rose above
2 million on an annualized basis, the cycle turned. In the ﬁrst three cycles,
starts then fell by more than 60 percent, to less than a million, before turn-
ing up again. In the current cycle, starts hit exactly a million in December
2007 and then bounced up and down for a few months. October 2008, the
most recent month for which data are available, was the slowest to date in
this cycle, with 625,000 starts.
Table 4 further illustrates the amazing regularity of the cycle in the
past. The top of every cycle ﬁnds real gross residential investment at about
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Millions






Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
a. Vertical bands indicate quarters of negative GDP growth. Shading indicates the decline in starts that would 
have been expected given the decline in economic activity in that period.
Figure 7. Housing Starts, Monthly Data, 1972–2008a
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ratio was on average 3.6 percent of real GDP. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis’s release of third-quarter GDP in October 2008, however, shows
that real gross residential investment has fallen below this historic floor,
to 3.0 percent. It shows no sign of rising soon.
Homebuilding is the only major industry that loses 60 percent of its
business in a normal contraction. In 2007 the national average cost of a
new home was roughly $300,000. After subtracting the value of land and
imported building materials (based on data from a number of sources,
including the National Association of Homebuilders, the Census Bureau’s
construction reports, and Engineering News Record), each start contributes
roughly $240,000 in new residential construction to GDP. With starts down
to 817,000 (again on an annualized basis), a total of 1.45 million units that
would have been built will not be started; their absence represents a demand
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Table 4. Gross Residential Investment and Housing Starts in Down Cycles, 1973–2008
Change 
Cycle Peak Trough (percent)
1973–75
Gross residential investment 1973Q1 1975Q1
Billions of 2000 dollars $308.3 $186.1 −40
As percent of GDP 7.2 4.4
Housing starts January 1973 February 1975
Millions of units 2.481 0.904 −64
1978–82
Gross residential investment 1978Q3 1982Q3
Billions of 2000 dollars $321.5 $175.6 −45
As percent of GDP 6.3 3.4
Housing starts December 1977 November 1981
Millions of units 2.142 0.837 −61
1984–91
Gross residential investment 1986Q3 1991Q1
Billions of 2000 dollars $341.3 $258.6 −24
As percent of GDP 5.4 3.7
Housing starts February 1984 January 1991
Millions of units 2.260 0.798 −65
2005–08
Gross residential investment 2005Q4 2008Q3
Billions of 2000 dollars $602.0 $353.7 −41
As percent of GDP 5.4 3.0
Housing starts January 2006 November 2008
Millions of units 2.273 0.625 −73
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Census Bureau construction reports, and Federal Reserve
Flow of Funds.
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decline in gross private residential investment from a peak of $808 billion
in 2006Q1 to $480 billion in 2008Q3. Assuming a multiplier of 1.4, this is
equivalent to a drop in aggregate demand of 3.2 percent.
Although past housing cycles have been regular in amplitude, their
length has varied. For example, the recovery in housing starts following
the recession of 1975 lasted from February 1975 through May 1978, and
that following the recession of 1980–81, when housing starts bottomed
out at 837,000 in November 1981, reached a new peak of 2.26 million by
February 1984. In contrast, the housing expansion that began in the early
1990s was much longer. From a bottom of 798,000 in January 1991, starts
took 15 years to climb back to 2.27 million (ﬁgure 7).
The data also show that although homebuilding paused in 1999–2000,
the housing market “skipped” a cycle. The easy availability of credit that
came with the slowdown in 2001 kept the housing market going: building
continued to rise through the next slowdown in the economy in 2002–04.
The shaded area in figure 7 simulates a typical decline in starts given 
the mild nature of the recession of 2000–01. Had the homebuilding sector
responded typically, 1.2 million fewer housing units would have been built
during that period. Census data show that between 2000 and 2004, new
housing units exceeded household formations by just fewer than 4 million.
With 1.2 million fewer units, the vacancy rate would have been about 
30 percent lower in 2004.
Housing Market Performance Depends on Credit Markets 
and Monetary Policy
Housing is far more responsive to interest rate changes than any other
sector. Historically, when the Federal Reserve has acted to stimulate or
slow the economy, housing has shown the greatest ﬁrst-order response of
any sector. The affordability of a given house depends ultimately on the
monthly payment, and that depends on the mortgage rate.
From 1970 until 2000, every recession was caused in part by a major
rate shock. Between March 1973 and July 1974, the federal funds rate
rose from 7 percent to 13 percent. From October 1978 to July 1981, the
Federal Reserve pushed the funds rate from 9 percent to almost 20 per-
cent. And from April 1988 to March 1989, it raised the funds rate from
below 7 percent to just under 10 percent. In each case the Federal Reserve
was responding to inﬂationary pressure. Similarly, toward the end of each
recession, rates came down and helped kick off a housing sector rally.
However, the relationship between monetary policy and the housing
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as the next section describes.
The Roots of the Crash
The 21st century began with an investment-led slowdown and the bursting
of the dot-com bubble. After a huge, investment-led expansion, includ-
ing a 29 percent increase in gross private domestic investment in 2000Q2,
investment dropped sharply for six quarters, dragging the economy into
negative growth in 2001. The expansion was largely due to expenditure
surrounding the Y2K problem, which led many ﬁrms to replace their entire
computer systems. Investment that would have taken place in 2002 and
2003 was effectively shifted to 1999 and 2000.
This period also differed from the beginnings of the three previous
recessions in its lack of inﬂationary pressure. The stock market peaked and
began to drop in early 2000, and the tragedies of September 11 created a
sense of real crisis late in 2001. In December 2001 the year-over-year
change in the CPI was 1.6 percent. Thus, the way was clear for aggressive
monetary policy to deal with the recession early, yet gross investment
spending was unable to respond to the stimulus of lower interest rates.
What responded were the mortgage market and, subsequently, the housing
market.
Figure 8 chronicles this period, using data carefully developed by
Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy,
12 who were able to reconcile the
differences among the various confusing sources of origination data.
Monetary policy began easing in January 2001, when the Federal Reserve
cut the funds rate by 50 basis points, from 6.5 percent to 6.0 percent. By
the end of the year, the central bank had cut rates 11 times, to 1.75 per-
cent. At the time the easing began, the average 30-year fixed conven-
tional mortgage rate was just below 7.2 percent, down slightly from an
average of 8.2 percent for the first nine months of 2000. By the time the
federal funds rate hit 1.75 percent in 2000Q4, the conventional fixed-
rate mortgage was down to 6.8 percent. But rates were just starting their
descent. The funds rate continued to decline until June 2003, when it hit
1 percent, by which time the average conventional 30-year ﬁxed-rate mort-
gage carried a rate of 5.3 percent. The funds rate then stayed at 1 percent
for over a year.
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8.2 percent, the monthly payment on a $300,000 conventional 30-year
mortgage with 20 percent down is $1,795 before tax beneﬁts. The monthly
payment on the same mortgage with a ﬁxed rate of 6.8 percent is $1,565,
and with a 5.3 percent rate it is $1,333. Thus, expansionary policy cut the
cost of buying a home by almost a third.
The sharply lower rates had a powerful effect on the mortgage and
housing markets. The housing market kept the economy out of recession
and helped it grow substantially through the turbulent early and mid-2000s.
Figure 8 shows that the volume of mortgage lending exploded at the end
of 2002, beginning with a huge reﬁnancing boom. Between 2002Q4 and
2003Q4, $5.5 trillion in mortgages was originated and $3.7 trillion was
paid off. Over ﬁve quarters the market’s total originations were about the
same as the total stock of mortgage debt outstanding in 2001. Seventy-ﬁve
percent of originations were reﬁnancings.
In June 2003 mortgage rates spiked and began to rise, jumping from
5.3 percent to 6.3 percent by August. The third quarter of 2003 saw the
highest-ever volume of reﬁnancings, with originations of $942 billion, as
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Sources: Greenspan and Kennedy (2005, with updates by James Kennedy); Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve; Standard & Poor’s.
Target Fed funds rate
   (right scale)
Refinance originations (left scale)
Purchase originations (left scale)
Figure 8. Mortgage Originations and the Target Federal Funds Rate, 2000–08
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over: in 2003Q4 reﬁnancings fell by 56 percent.
During the expansion of credit up to the end of 2003, the mortgage
industry grew and became highly competitive. With fee income averaging
about 2.5 percent on each transaction, the sector earned over $100 billion
on total originations of $4 trillion in 2003. In addition, the book of business
had very low default rates.
Armed with huge books of proﬁtable business, booming home prices,
very low default and foreclosure rates, and general prosperity, along with
the federal government’s continued push for the American dream of home-
ownership, lenders competed for homebuyers’ business. Purchase origina-
tions doubled from $239 billion in 2004Q1 to $478 billion in 2005Q3.
Much of the business was directed at low-cost neighborhoods and subprime
borrowers. In all, between 2002Q4 and 2006Q4, the market originated a
staggering $14.4 trillion in mortgage paper, paid off $10.3 trillion, and
pushed the value of total one-to-four-family residential mortgage liabilities
from $6.2 trillion to $10.3 trillion, according to the Greenspan-Kennedy
data. Table 5 uses data collected by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act to show
how lending shifted into low- and moderate-income tracts in virtually every
metropolitan area.
Credit expansion of this magnitude had a major impact on the housing
market. Prices rose across the board. As shown in table 2, between 2000
and 2006 bottom-tier prices increased the most, by 241 percent in Miami,
240 percent in Los Angeles, and just under 200 percent in Washington,
D.C., and San Diego. The S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 10 and Composite
20 indexes more than doubled, and the national index was up nearly 
90 percent.
Finally, at the end of 2005 and into 2006, the housing market began to
soften for a variety of reasons. Interest rates rose, as Federal Reserve tight-
ening pushed the federal funds rate back up to 5.4 percent and the 30-year
mortgage rate followed to 6.6 percent by the second half of 2006. Gluts of
speculative building occurred in Arizona, Florida, and Nevada. Housing in
California and the Northeast became very expensive relative to incomes.
The manufacturing base of the Midwest fell into recession. As expectations
turned gloomy, 16 of the 20 Case-Shiller metro areas saw prices falling in
2005 or 2006. By 2007 all 20 were falling.
Inventories of housing rose. In the past, when markets had overshot,
prices were sticky and adjustment was orderly. But with home prices falling
nationally, and with virtually all of the current mortgage debt having been
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rate rose sharply.
Meanwhile underwriting practices had changed. Over the past 30 years,
default and foreclosure models had been developed that seemed to “explain”
differences in default and claim incidence as a function of borrower and
loan characteristics. All market participants used these models, sometimes
without even knowing it. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac wrote the code
for their ironically named automated underwriting systems, “Desktop
Underwriter” (now sometimes called “Desktop Undertaker”) and “Loan
Prospector,” by running thousands of regressions, which reported high
explanatory power. Their speciﬁc purpose was to accurately price the risk
that originators and secondary market participants were taking. Their low
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Table 5. Originations in Low- and Moderate-Income Census Tracts by Metropolitan
Area, 1999–2006






Metropolitan areaa 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 peak 2008
Detroit 10 11 12 13 25 28 30 . . . . . .
Boston 17 18 18 19 26 29 30 119 −21
Miami 14 14 13 14 21 24 27 241 −46
Phoenix 13 14 13 15 20 24 26 139 −48
Los Angeles 11 13 13 16 23 24 25 240 −46
Chicago 9 14 14 16 20 22 23 84 −18
New York 9 9 10 12 18 21 23 160 −14
San Francisco 17 17 17 17 20 23 23 176 −58
San Diego 13 13 14 15 21 22 23 197 −46
Washington, D.C. 13 13 14 16 19 21 23 197 −36
Tampa 15 15 14 15 18 21 23 180 −34
Portland, Ore. 12 12 11 12 18 20 21 100 −9
A t l a n t a 1 21 31 31 41 82 02 1 3 8 −17
Seattle 12 12 12 13 18 19 20 102 −13
Denver 18 17 16 16 19 20 20 39 −15
Minneapolis 10 10 11 12 16 18 18 88 −26
Cleveland 15 14 13 13 16 18 17 33 −27
Dallas 12 11 10 10 12 13 13 . . . . . .
Charlotte 9999 1 2 1 1 1 2 . . .. . .
Las Vegas 5444 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 −45
United States 12 12 12 12 16 18 18
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Standard & Poor’s, and author’s calculations.
a. Metropolitan areas are ordered by their 2006 values.
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and mortgage insurance companies that would not accept their decisions
received no business.
The stated goal was to transform the current patchwork risk alloca-
tion process into a more efficient and accurate risk-based pricing sys-
tem. The problem was that the regressions on which the automated
systems were based had been run with data from a 30-year period of
continuously rising national home prices, where regional price declines
coincided with regional economic performance. Thus, the model con-
cluded that as long as a portfolio was regionally diversified and pricing
was based on credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, and so forth, the busi-
ness would be profitable. When instead home prices declined every-
where and the regional cycles became more synchronized, the model no
longer fit the data.
Another problem was that the timing of performance-based adjustments
to underwriting standards was subject to the “fool in the shower” problem.
Consider a city that experiences the time path of home values shown in
figure 9. The timing of the turns is unknown ex ante. The optimal time to
apply the brakes on writing risk is precisely when prices are rising. Paper
written at the peak is the most vulnerable, but at that moment default rates
are at a minimum. In the current downturn, the disastrous 2005 and 2006
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Home prices
Time
Excellent performance, high risk
Poor performance, low risk
Figure 9. Home Prices and Underwriting Credit Risk
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excellent results with few defaults.
What Are the Indexes Telling Us Now?
The years between 2000 and 2005 witnessed a boom of historical pro-
portions, as described in detail above. That boom enjoyed credit market
underpinning unlike any other in history. Indeed, the period from 2000 to
2008 is among the truly important economic episodes of the last century.
Today all eyes are still focused on home prices, to see what will happen
next. How fast and how far will prices fall? And when will some sense of
equilibrium be restored?
To a very large extent, the media, the regulators, and the public are all
relying on the various indexes, including the S&P/Case-Shiller indexes,
that are reported each month and, in at least one instance, each day. Some
regulators and accounting ﬁrms are using the indexes on a metropolitan-
area basis to value portfolios of distressed housing-backed assets. The
indexes are meant to measure changes in the “market value” of housing,
essentially single-family houses, in a given area. From a legal perspective,
the market price for a property is what a willing buyer would agree to pay a
willing seller in an arm’s-length exchange, which implies that in calculating
an index point, every available arm’s-length sale should be considered. If
this market were pricing a relatively homogeneous good, measuring price
movements would be simple. But in the housing market today, two kinds
of prices are being generated from two fundamentally different equilibrium
processes. These two processes operate side by side, often neighborhood
by neighborhood, within metropolitan areas.
The ﬁrst is the traditional search process involving would-be homebuy-
ers and individual homeowners wishing to sell; this process is characterized
by downwardly sticky prices, high inventory, and aversion to loss on the
part of sellers. Liquidity-constrained sellers are actually more reluctant to
sell than unconstrained sellers, because selling may have high transactions
costs. Evidence also suggests that homeowners do not like to sell at a loss.
This type of market clearing is slow, usually resulting in an extended and
costly period of quantity adjustment with relatively little price change. Sec-
ond, and concurrently, banks, servicers, and other players are left holding
portfolios of houses acquired through default and foreclosure. These proper-
ties are typically auctioned off to the highest bidder, often at very low prices.
The parallel operation of these two processes is not a new phenomenon.
In every past regional decline, both processes worked together to clear the
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home prices were down roughly 11 percent, yet the glutted condominium
markets had concentrations of ill-advised conversions that lost 75 percent
of their original value when sold at auction.
13 Table 6 presents average
sale prices for a nonrandom sample of zip codes in Massachusetts through
2008Q2, showing that prices in the areas of low and moderate income-price
ratios are down signiﬁcantly more than in areas with higher ratios. Evidence
suggests that foreclosed properties in most cities trade at signiﬁcantly
larger losses than properties not in foreclosure. Fiserv CSW has calculated
preliminary repeat sales indexes on cities with large quantities of foreclosed
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Table 6. Changes in Home Prices in Massachusetts, Second Quarter 2008
Percent change
Median price
City or town One year Five years Ten years (dollars)
Brockton −14.85 +6.53 +137.06 230,000
Lawrence −13.02 +14.01 +167.94 165,000
Worcester −11.28 +6.76 +101.64 230,000
Lynn −10.47 +5.40 +109.33 250,500
North Dartmouth −10.15 +13.72 +123.90 258,000
Northborough −9.09 +5.02 +83.97 372,000
North Andover −7.48 +2.81 +77.53 500,000
Westborough −6.43 +7.19 +82.55 350,000
Andover −5.55 +3.63 +81.47 519,000
Lynnﬁeld −5.22 +10.45 +103.29 494,000
Southborough −5.20 +9.75 +88.92 533,000
Springﬁeld −5.15 +46.53 +125.77 159,000
Weymouth −5.00 +10.53 +127.50 285,000
Gloucester −4.45 +8.31 +105.27 385,000
North Adams −3.82 +40.14 +101.58 127,000
Walpole −2.66 +11.68 +98.75 402,500
Billerica −2.51 +9.87 +94.99 326,000
Weston −0.94 +13.62 +95.45 1,202,500
Lexington −0.45 +11.70 +98.29 839,000
Wellesley Hills −0.29 +16.73 +101.76 1,210,000
Lincoln −0.22 +12.03 +99.14 1,045,000
Dover +0.21 +17.50 +105.37 932,500
Needham +0.64 +16.10 +103.57 716,500
Belmont +0.68 +17.21 +108.87 722,500
Waltham +1.03 +16.26 +109.30 389,000
Newton +2.74 +19.93 +110.01 895,500
Cambridge +12.63 +40.75 +166.84 590,000
Source: Fiserv CSW.
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as of 2008Q1, the index with the full sample showed a 22 percent decline
since the peak of prices, whereas the index excluding auction sales showed
only a 15 percent decline (figure 10). In Chicago the comparable figures
are 10 percent and 7 percent. The difference is greater for Cleveland.
There are three potential explanations for these differences. First, the
foreclosed properties are typically, although not exclusively, in neigh-
borhoods in the lower tier that had experienced rapid run-ups and very
high peaks in 2006 and 2007 (see table 2). Second, auction sales typically
involve less “price discovery” and search. Although not all such sales are
fire sales, most firms that hold foreclosed property prefer to move it off
their balance sheets quickly. Third, many foreclosure properties are not
properly maintained during the foreclosure process; thus, some substantial
unobserved quality change can occur. The indexes have some remedies for
these problems.
In using the indexes to value the stock of housing, it is important to
understand that all are based on transactions. To the extent that these trans-
actions do not represent the stock, the indexes may be a biased estimator of
changes in the stock’s value. The only way to deal with this problem is to















Figure 10. S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for Miami, 1972–2008
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or zip code–level data.
Finally, which states have the biggest problems? Table 7 gives a rough
estimate of the value of owner-occupied housing by state.
14 The biggest
area of concern, California, accounts for almost 25 percent of total home
value nationwide. Florida and California, which together account for just
under a third of the home value in the country, are experiencing the great-
est declines in value.
Table 8 reports ratios of foreclosure sales (both “notice of trustee sales”
and “notice of foreclosure sales”) to total sales of existing homes for
2006Q3 to 2008Q1. (Total sales are from state data; a few states where the
data are not consistent are excluded.) For the United States as a whole, this
ratio doubled over the period, from 9.3 percent to 18.8 percent. The highest
ratios are in Arizona (86 percent), Nevada (62 percent in 2007Q4; this
figure fell in 2008Q1), and Georgia (46 percent). California and Florida
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Table 7. Value of Owner-Occupied Housing in Selected States, Fourth Quarter 2005
Percent of total U.S. 
State Billions of dollars housing value
United States 18,336 100.0
California 4,554 24.8
Florida 1,389 7.6
New York 1,382 7.5
Connecticut 898 4.9














District of Columbia 55 0.3
Above 19 states 81.8
Source: Case (2007); author’s calculations.
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Percent
State 2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1
United States 9.3 9.3 11.1 12.8 18.0 18.1 18.8
Arizona 19.6 24.4 32.8 46.1 81.0 70.0 86.3
Nevada 7.4 11.7 20.5 31.3 29.6 62.0 19.7
Georgia 19.8 25.8 29.3 29.3 39.6 45.5 45.6
Colorado 35.3 42.7 41.2 51.1 55.8 41.9 42.0
Michigan 26.6 24.6 22.5 37.6 47.8 41.7 44.3
California 4.3 6.3 10.2 19.5 30.9 39.9 32.4
Maryland 4.4 3.7 5.8 8.9 25.5 34.2 38.6
Utah 12.6 11.5 12.4 11.2 14.6 26.1 32.3
Ohio 15.8 15.9 18.6 19.2 30.4 25.7 17.7
Florida 5.6 4.9 12.8 11.8 21.3 24.6 24.3
Rhode Island 11.1 9.7 14.3 17.0 18.7 24.6 47.7
Virginia 3.2 2.6 4.9 8.6 21.1 20.7 33.0
Washington 10.6 11.5 14.1 14.1 16.3 19.4 20.9
Texas 24.1 20.0 21.5 13.7 23.3 19.0 18.2
Arkansas 11.3 11.3 12.9 16.3 15.4 17.9 18.0
Indiana 13.0 n.a. 15.3 11.8 20.3 16.0 14.7
Tennessee 10.0 12.3 12.3 15.2 17.2 14.5 15.8
Missouri 5.0 5.5 5.5 9.8 10.5 14.3 14.7
Minnesota 4.4 5.9 5.9 7.7 13.5 13.5 12.0
Nebraska 7.0 8.6 8.6 5.6 8.5 12.8 7.6
Pennsylvania 9.2 6.5 11.2 9.8 11.7 10.7 9.4
Dist. of  0.0 0.3 0.2 1.2 10 10.4 48.3
Columbia
Alaska 3.1 3.4 2.9 3.6 4.8 9.5 4.5
Idaho n.a. n.a. 8.2 7.6 12.4 9.1 19.4
Massachusetts 8.4 5.0 6.1 12.8 16.2 8.8 27.5
Montana 3.0 4.9 4.5 4.6 4.9 6.8 7.1
Oregon 3.4 6.7 2.6 3.3 4.2 6.1 7.8
Illinois 4.4 3.1 2.8 3.5 3.9 6.1 3.4
Iowa 0.6 3.9 5.3 3.7 7.0 5.8 5.3
Wisconsin 2.0 2.5 2.9 3.2 5.3 5.8 7.9
Hawaii 1.3 2.0 2.3 3.6 4.7 5.4 5.3
New Jersey 4.4 4.6 6.0 5.5 9.3 5.2 7.8
Alabama 2.1 4.2 3.2 3.1 3.9 4.9 4.4
Kansas 3.6 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.8
Oklahoma 5.4 4.7 6.1 4.7 6.8 4.7 5.5
Connecticut 3.0 2.1 3.7 5.7 4.0 4.4 7.8
Kentucky 3.1 3.1 3.8 5.0 5.3 4.3 3.8
Maine 0.8 0.7 0.5 4.7 4.2 3.6 5.7
New York 5.1 4.1 2.3 2.5 3.7 2.6 3.7
Mississippi 0.9 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.2
West Virginia 2.3 3.1 2.8 6.3 4.0 1.7 1.6
South Dakota 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.4
South Carolina 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0
Wyoming 2.1 2.4 1.0 0.5 3.7 0.9 0.3
New Mexico 1.2 1.6 1.5 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2
Vermont 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
North Dakota 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Sources: National Association of Realtors, Existing Home Sales; Realtytrac.
a. States are listed in descending order by values in 2007Q4. Delaware, Louisiana, New Hampshire,
and North Carolina are omitted because of data inconsistencies.
11472-03_Case_rev.qxd  3/6/09  12:27 PM  Page 189have ratios of 32.4 percent and 24.3, percent, respectively. Table 9 shows
the shifting distribution of states by the extent of foreclosure sales. Fore-
closures are fewer than 5 percent of total existing-home sales in only 14
states today, compared with 27 states in 2006Q3. At the other extreme,
only two states had ratios of over 30 percent in 2006. That figure is now
10 states.
Updates through November 2008 show a substantial drop in total existing-
home sales to 4.49 million, at a seasonally adjusted annual rate from a
revised 4.91 million in October. Total existing-home sales had been
essentially flat at 5 million for a year before the drop in November. Auc-
tion sales in November alone totaled 87,700, or about 27 percent of the
unadjusted monthly total of 322,000 existing-home sales. California and
Florida together accounted for 40 percent of all auction sales in the country
in November.
How long will it take for prices to stabilize? The bulk of analysts say it
will take a long time. Shiller argues, as does Mark Zandi, that it will take
until well into 2010 or longer.
15 They point to the backlog of unresolved
“underwater” mortgages, coming resets of interest rates, large inventories
of unsold properties, and the legal delays entailed in unwinding the layers
of risk and liabilities built into the new credit instruments. In addition, the
crashing stock market and what appears to be a serious recession cast doubt
on any overly conﬁdent forecast. Add to that uncertainty about the behavior
of homebuyers and sellers in a down market nationwide, an environment
for which little data are available, and it is no wonder that the futures and
190 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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sales 2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1
Less than 5 27 27 22 21 18 15 14
≥5 and <10 9 8 9 10 7 10 11
≥10 and <15 5597563
≥15 and <20 3225657
≥20 and <25 1230432
≥25 and <30 1111221
30 or greater 232467 1 0
Sources: Realtytrac and National Association of Realtors.
No. of states with indicated share of foreclosure auctions
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that a continued decline in prices could make the 2008 and 2009 books of
mortgages unproﬁtable, prolonging the credit crunch.
Is there any good news? First, it is clear that the two market clear-
ing processes described above are proceeding in a fairly orderly way. In
November 2008 existing-home sales dropped, yet nearly 4.5 million homes
(at a seasonally adjusted annual rate) were sold. Although auction sales
accounted for 27 percent of the total, that means traditional sales still
accounted for 73 percent. In cities like Boston, the current downturn has
not been as severe as that of early 1990, from which the market recovered
in a remarkably short time.
Second, the battle of the “plans” is under way. Economists and policy-
makers are focused on settling on a strategy to prevent foreclosures. Pre-
venting foreclosures reduces moving costs, potential vandalism, and the
litigation and high transactions costs that often follow foreclosures. In
addition, as the number of auctions inevitably declines, traditional sales
will gain strength in the home price indexes, and downward resistance will
stabilize aggregate prices more quickly.
It is often said that prices will stop rising only when they return to
“fundamentals.” But what are the fundamentals in housing, and in particu-
lar in land? People will bid for locations as long as those with ability to pay
are willing to pay for them. Only time will tell when that will be.
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